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   Deep Purple:  Religious Shades of Family Law 
 
Naomi Cahn and June Carbone∗ 
 
[N]o analysis of religious-liberty claims can take place in a vacuum. If the parents 
in this case are allowed a religious exemption, the inevitable effect is to impose 
the parents' notions of religious duty upon their children. Where the child is 
mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an invasion 
of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without canvassing his views.1 
 
Much of the nation is moving toward an "abstinence-only" approach to sex 
education, which emphasizes the advantages of confining sex to marriage. But 
school systems in liberal communities are heading in the opposite direction, 
teaching more about sexual orientation, as well as contraception and abstinence, 
in what is termed "comprehensive" sex education.2 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2 
II.  RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE:  A TIME OF DIVISION? ................................ 9 
III. RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE:  THE CASE OF ABSTINENCE    
EDUCATION ........................................................................................................ 18 
IV.  THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND CULTURE ................................................... 33 
V.  TOWARD CONSENSUS?   YES AND NO ........................................................... 42 
CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 47 
APPENDIX A............................................................................................... 52 
                                                 
∗ Naomi Cahn is John Theodore Fey Research Professor of Law, GWU Law School.  June Carbone is ___ 
Chair, UMKC.  We thank Vivian Hamilton and the other organizers of the WVU symposium for the 
opportunity to share our thoughts on religion and public policy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
 In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court considered whether Amish parents 
could be convicted for failing to send their adolescent children to school as required by 
the state’s mandatory education law.3  The Court held that the parents’ religious free 
exercise claims protected them from prosecution, notwithstanding Justice Douglas’s 
warning that this would allow parents to impose their religious views on their children.   
The Court disingenuously explained, “our holding today in no degree depends on the 
assertion of the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the parents.”4.   
Abstinence education in contemporary America presents the issue the Supreme 
Court explicitly did not decide in Yoder:  the extent to which parents’ religious views 
may appropriately foreclose their children’s life choices.   Abstinence education in the 
context of public education does so in a way that is importantly and subtly different from 
the much more direct issue in Yoder of mandatory education laws.   For the public school 
population as a whole, it reinforces a cultural script that encourages early marriage and 
reproduction, perpetuates traditional attitudes about sex and gender, and forecloses 
greater autonomy in the creation of family life.  Moreover, abstinence only education, 
which is strongly rooted in religious beliefs, has been shown to be of limited 
effectiveness in delaying teen sexual activity, and counterproductive to the extent it 
discourages contraceptive use.   
                                                 
3  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
4 Yoder, supra note __, at 231; see generally Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 Pa J Const 
L 53, 67 (1999).  For more recent Supreme Court statements concerning parental control over their 
children’s education, see Elk Grove v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 14-15 (2004).   
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So long as secular and religious beliefs about the propriety of premarital sex 
coincided, and so long as a secular justification for abstinence education existed, such 
teachings posed no constitutional issue.  As age of family formation increasingly 
reinforces class advantage, however, and as the secular justifications for abstinence only 
programs become increasingly attenuated, the issue becomes much more direct.  Can – 
and should – the state mandate instruction whose principal effect is to reinforce religious 
understandings of the good life, and does so with disproportionate impact on the life 
opportunities of the least advantaged students?  While others have explored the rights of 
minors to information,5 this paper examines the impact of religion on the politics and 
jurisprudence of abstinence education in the context of the contemporary culture war 
between red and blue state values.   
 
 Underlying these issues are more general questions concerning the relationship 
between family law and religion.  What role does religion play in the politics of family 
law?  Does it play a mediating role by providing a foundation for shared values, 
individual discipline and social order?  Or does religion, with its emphasis on divinely 
ordained precepts, contribute to ideological polarization?   
The earliest understandings of religion and politics saw religion as a force 
constitutive of identity and loyalty.  The rise of the nation-state itself rested on shared 
religious observances that identified monarchs with divine selection and national identity.  
Anthropologist Scott Atran, in describing the origins of his research into an evolutionary 
role for religion, explains, ''I started looking at history, and I wondered why no society 
                                                 
5   See, e.g., Catherine Ross Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in Protecting Children from 
Controversial Speech. 53 Vand. L. Rev. 427 (2000); Hazel Beh & Milton Diamond, Children and 
Education:  The Failure of Abstinence-Only Education:  Minors have a Right to Honest Talk about Sex,  15 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 12 (2006).  
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ever survived more than three generations without a religious foundation as its raison 
d'etre.''6  That religious foundation may be responsible for the growth of human societies 
beyond the hundred-and-fifty or so closely related individuals that tended to mark the 
outer limits of hunter-gatherer organization.   
If religion is therefore critical in defining associations, nations and causes, does 
not its very role in providing cohesion also lead to conflict?  Indeed, the famed 
primatologist Frans de Waal suggests that the development of a sense of morality, which 
served as a precursor to the origins of religion, developed out of the need to create 
communal bonds against a common adversary.7   He observes, “the profound irony is that 
our noblest achievement – morality – has evolutionary ties to our basest behavior—
warfare.”8   
The most difficult issues arise, then, when religions differ on core beliefs or when 
religious and secular understandings collide in the definition of morality.9  Successful 
multicultural societies have historically negotiated careful boundaries in the face of such 
divisions.  Thus, the United States quickly decided to treat marriage as a civil issue, with 
secular authorities determining the all-important issues of legitimacy and inheritance, 
while permitting a broad array of religious and secular ceremonies to celebrate the 
event.10  It upheld bans on polygamy, reinforcing the identification of the Judeo-Christian 
                                                 
6 Robin Marantz Henig, Darwin's God, N.Y. Times Mag., March 4, 2007, p. 37.   
7 Nicholas Wade, Scientists Find the Beginnings of Morality in Primate Behavior, N.Y. Times, March 20, 
2007.   
8 Frans de Waal, Our Inner Ape 212 (2005). 
9 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 147 (1993); June Carbone, Autonomy to Choose what Constitutes a 
Family:  Oxymoron or Basic Right 19 (2006), avail. at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=935418#PaperDownload.   
10 For a summary of this history, see Joel Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage: Ideas and Influences from New 
York and Louisiana to the International Community, 40 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 135, 143 (2006); see also 
Daniel A. Crane, ABOLISHING CIVIL MARRIAGE: A "JUDEO-CHRISTIAN" ARGUMENT FOR 
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emphasis on monogamy with the secular values of democracy and equality.11  And it has 
granted parents a sphere of authority over their children that includes the ability to insist 
that they learn German, but not, as Barbara Woodhouse noted, the ability to send them to 
work at too young an age instead.12   Each of these decisions involves reaffirmation of the 
core values that define the society of the time and a measure of leeway for religious 
observances that can coexist with the core.   
This balancing act of religious and secular values becomes most acute, however, 
when societal changes pull these two sets of understandings apart.   Among the many 
emerging divisions in the culture wars that currently pit religious fundamentalists against 
the secular coasts is the issue of teen sexuality.  At one point in the not so distant past, the 
issue would have commanded consensus.   A half century ago, unmarried sexuality 
would have been widely regarded as sinful, selfish or misguided.  Parental vigilance and 
authority over teen activity followed accordingly.   Schools, whether public or private, 
would have been expected to reinforce the dominant norm of premarital chastity.  And, 
the appropriate response to an improvident pregnancy in both religious and secular circles 
was marriage or adoption.13   
                                                                                                                                                 
PRIVATIZING MARRIAGE, 27 Card. L. Rev. 1221 (2006) (comparison of different religious 
understandings of marriage). 
11 See Orma Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 Utah L. Rev. 308 (1964) 
(summarizing Supreme Court jurisprudence addressing federal anti-polygamy laws in the second half of the 
nineteenth century); Shayna M. Sigman EVERYTHING LAWYERS KNOW ABOUT POLYGAMY IS 
WRONG, 16 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 101 (2006)(describing history of legal efforts to outlaw polygamy). 
12 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 
33 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 995, 1041-50 (1992).  For a discussion of the line drawing between religious and 
secular education in a different era, see Sarah Barringer Gordon,  "FREE" RELIGION AND "CAPTIVE" 
SCHOOLS: PROTESTANTS, CATHOLICS, AND EDUCATION, 1945-1965, 2007, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 
1177 (2007) (describing the role of Catholic schools in providing public education, and the resulting 
Catholic-Protestant divisions over the practice). 
13 For a comprehensive discussion of the role of adoption in reinforcing norms of chastity, see Rickie 
Solinger, Wake-Up Little Susie:  Single Pregnancy and Race Before Roe v. Wade (1992).   
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These views no longer follow so automatically.   The average age of marriage has 
risen into the mid-twenties, ninety percent of adults will engage in sexual intercourse 
before they enter more permanent unions, and the length of time between the beginning 
of sexual activity and marriage has reached seven years for women, more for men.14  
Managing sexuality has accordingly become more critical in many parts of the country 
than deterring intercourse and, indeed, a majority of adults and a supermajority of those 
between 18 and 29 no longer object to extramarital intercourse at all.15  Moreover, a 
marriage prompted by an improvident teen pregnancy is unlikely to endure or, if the 
effect is to derail the parents’ formal education, to provide a solid financial foundation for 
childrearing.  Accordingly, introduction to effective contraception has become an 
important part of the transition to adulthood, and, for many, abortion rather than marriage 
or adoption is the necessary fallback.   
These shifting views, however, directly threaten the religious teachings that once 
underlay the secular as well as sectarian approaches to family values.  If sex outside of 
marriage is immoral, and marriage is the institution designed by heavenly mandate for 
procreation, how can society tolerate divergent views on beliefs so central to the 
definition of a “good life?”  The differences go to the core of the views that mark 
adherence to faith, and the stakes include the ability to influence the life patterns and 
beliefs of the next generation.  As a result, the deeply religious and secular part of the 
country have grown apart on such basic issues as: 
                                                 
14   See Naomi Cahn and June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families, avail. at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1008544. 
15   See id. 
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1) the best approach to teen parenting: assertion of authority v. open 
communication and negotiated solutions;16 
2) the existence of homosexuality as a chosen (and immoral) lifestyle or innate 
characteristic;17 
3) the role of sexuality as a natural activity to be managed for mutual enjoyment 
or as sinful pleasure necessarily restricted to marriage;18 
4) the existence of gender differences as fixed and important to the proper 
ordering of family life, or as socially constructed, unnecessary and malleable;19 
5) the acceptability of abortion as a responsible decision not to bear a child in less 
than ideal conditions or its rejection as the self-indulgent act of a woman 
unwilling to bear the consequences of “sinful” behavior;20 
6) the role of the state as neutral among competing definitions of the good or 
necessary to reinforce the fragile underpinnings of the discipline necessary to 
realize the promise of Western civilization.21   
These differences are differences of belief, culture, style, and personality.  To a 
degree, they may reflect genetic predisposition.22  They certainly involve differences in 
cultural teaching and inheritance.  They also play out on regional and racial lines, with 
urban and rural variations.   And they may be self-perpetuating.   To continue to insist on 
traditional moral teachings requires marriage relatively soon, if not before, the beginning 
of sexual activity.  Early marriage, in turn, requires emphasis on abstinence, and 
stigmatizing non-marital activity.  Early marriage, however, may shortchange educational 
opportunities, and increase the risk of divorce,23 which can contribute to greater poverty 
for the next generation.   These experiences may in turn fuel greater urgency in 
reinforcing traditional values.  And both early marriage and traditional values emphasize 
                                                 
16 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
19 Although this article focuses less on attitudes toward gender differences, they are an important 
component of traditionalist worldviews.  See Kristin Luker, Abortion and The Politics of Motherhood 
(1985). 
20 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes and accompanying text. 
22 See infra nn. (discussing Hibbing et al.). 
23 See David Popenoe and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Ten Things Teens Should Know about Marriage 
(2003), avail. at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SourcesThings4Teens.htm (nothing that teens who 
marry may be 200-300% more likely to get divorced than those who marry at a later age). 
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gendered family roles, and deference to external authority rather than education that 
enhances autonomy and the ability to manage choice.    
This paper examines the role of religion in reinforcing conflicting approaches to 
fundamental cultural values that, in turn, affect the family lives of Americans.  Families 
who live in red and blue states are experiencing divergent life patterns, and religion 
affects the development of these patterns.  Frequency of church attendance has been tied 
to likelihood of marriage,24 and, as this paper shows, has been profoundly influential in 
approaches to teen sexuality.  Religion decreases the opportunity for dialogue and 
compromise on these issues because, as Section Two discusses, people use underlying 
values -- such as religion -- as a way of helping them decide about social issues such as 
gay marriage and teen pregnancy.   For those who interpret information through a pre-
existing worldview, more information will not affect the approach to deeply contested 
issues.  The central part of the paper examines conflicting approaches to the deeply 
divisive issue of abstinence education, demonstrating how religion contributes to the 
conflict in perspectives.  Finally, the paper explores potential means for resolving these 
cultural tensions or at least for managing them within a federal system that maintains 
fidelity to the rule of law.25  Ultimately, the paper argues that changing religiously 
influenced laws, such as those supporting abstinence education, is as much a political and 
social process as a legal one.     
                                                 
24  See, e.g., W. Bradford Wilcox, Religion, Race, and Relationships in Urban America  (2007), available at 
http://center.americanvalues.org/?p=57. 
25 See Paul Callister, Identity and Market for Loyalties Theories: The Case for Free Information Flow in 
Insurgent Iraq, 25 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 123 (2006) (on the relationship between identity and the rule of 
law (SSRN).  There is always the risk, of course, as with the abortion cases that to the extent citizens feel 
they must choose between adherence to an immoral or unjust law and their individual consciences, the rule 
of law itself will be the casualty.  Callister makes the point that the danger is particularly great when the 
issue goes to the core of identity, which we will argue that it does here. 
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II. RELIGION, POLITICS, AND CULTURE: A TIME OF DIVISION? 
 The relationship between religion and politics is historically thick and complex.  In 
contemporary America, scholars are providing increasingly rich exploration of how 
religion shapes political campaigns, using sociological, demographic, and psychological 
data. Legislation on social issues, such as gay marriage, teenage abortion, and abstinence 
education has shown the influence of various religious values at both the state and federal 
level. Several researchers have suggested that political efforts to appeal to certain 
religious groups is contributing to a dichotomization of American culture, rather than 
mediating between extreme positions.26  As this research and legislation suggest, 
American society may be developing two different approaches to social issues, one that 
claims to be grounded in religious and moral values, while another that claims to be 
reflecting the dramatic changes that are occurring to the American family.  Social science 
techniques deepen understanding of the phenomenon, and these studies emphasize that 
the modern role of religion in American politics has changed markedly. 
 First, the religious divide has become much less one between religions, and much 
more one between traditionalists and modernists.   David Campbell, in his summary of 
these developments, emphasizes that whereas political identification once followed 
religious lines – Catholics tended to vote Democratic, mainstream Protestants for the 
Republicans – today, the more important differences are those between the devout and 
                                                 
26   E.g., EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND REALITIES OF AMERICAN 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, HARVARD INSTITUTE ON ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Discussion Paper 
No. 2100, January 2006 (concluding that American political divisions have reverted to their pre-New Deal 
form, and have become increasingly religious and cultural). See also John W. Evans, Have Americans’ 
Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71 (2004); (concluding that activists 
have become more partisan and polarized on values issues); MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & 
JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA. (2004)(disputing the polarization 
thesis and maintaining that public attitudes have been remarkably stable). 
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the less observant.27    
These differences have played out in the most recent elections.  The Pew Forum on 
Religion & Public Life has found that, of people who attend religious services more than 
once per week, 38% voted Democratic, and 60% voted Republican, a number that 
remained consistent in 2002, 2004, and 2006.28  Among people who never attend 
religious services, 67% vote Democratic, compared to 30% who vote Republican.29  
Among white Protestants, 37% voted Democratic, 61% Republican in 2006, a gap that 
narrowed from 30% Democratic and 68% Republican in 2002.30 
Second, the devout may differ from others in worldviews attributable to more than 
time spent in church or even intensity of beliefs.   James Hunter observes that 
traditionalists in almost all religions seek an "external, definable, and transcendent 
authority."31  Indeed, the National Election Survey further identifies traditionalist voting 
patterns in accordance with responses to four statements that emphasize openness to 
change and attitudes toward family values: 
(1) The world is always changing and moral values should adjust to those 
changes. 
(2) The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society. 
(3) We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their 
own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own. 
(4) This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis 
on traditional family ties.32 
                                                 
27 David E. Campbell, What Social Science Has To Say About The Culture War, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill of 
Rts. J. 59, 64  (2006) (describing a “devotional divide” in which 67% of those who attended services once a 
week or more voted Republican in 2004 in comparison with 47% of those who attended services less 
often). 
28 Religion and the 2006 Elections, available at http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=174. 
29   Id. 
30 Id. 
31 James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars? The Struggle to Define America 44 (1991). 
32 NES 2004 Post Election Questionnaire, http://www.umich.edu/nes/studypages/2004 
prepost/2004prepost.htm (follow "Post-election" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).  Campbell reports 
that: “Only twenty-four percent of people  who score in the bottom quartile of the traditionalism index 
voted for Bush in 2004, compared to fifty-five percent in the second quartile, seventy-three percent in the 
third, and eighty-four percent in the top quartile. When we compare level of traditionalism versus religious 
 11
 
 Third, these differences in attitudes may correspond to genetic prepositions 
toward change and authority.  Religious and political identification (Republicans v. 
Democrats, Protestants, Jews) is often a product of parental influence and upbringing.33  
The choice of more fundamentalist positions within a party or religion, however, is more 
likely to reflect individual preferences and personalities.   In an innovative study of the 
relationship between genes and politics, three political scientists compared identical and 
fraternal twins to differentiate the effect of environment from genetics in the development 
of political attitudes. 34   The researchers concluded that:  “Genetics accounts for 
approximately half of the variance in ideology, while shared environment including 
parental influence accounts for only 11%." 35   
 To reach this conclusion, the study used data on the responses of identical and 
fraternal twins to 28 different issues, ranging from school prayer to federal housing, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
tradition, it is clearly traditionalism that makes the difference. Among Protestants, in fact, denomination 
makes no difference once traditionalism is taken into account. When we look at both evangelical and 
mainline Protestants, eighty-nine percent who scored in the highest quartile of moral traditionalism voted 
for Bush.”  
33 John R. Alford, Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing, Are Political Orientations Genetically 
Transmitted?, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 153, 157, 160 (2005)(group identification, e.g., the children of 
Methodists tend to be Methodists, reflects parental socialization in contrast with views on particular issues). 
34 Alford, et al., supra, at 164; for a mild critique, see Barry Burden, The Genetic Bases of Political 
Attitudes, http://www.iq.harvard.edu/blog/pb/2005/10/the_genetic_bases_of_political_1.html (“The 
process by which specific attitudes are shaped by genetics, therefore, remains largely a black box.). See 
also John Hibbing and John Alford, Accepting Authoritative Decisions:  Humans as War Cooperators, 48 
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 62 (2004); John Orbell, et al., Machiavelllian Intelligences a Basis for the Evolution of 
Cooperative Dispositions, 98 AM. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (March 2004).  For an argument against their 
conclusions, see Why Twin Studies Are Problematic for the Study of Political Ideology: 
Rethinking Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted? 
Elizabeth Suhay and Nathan Kalmoe, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan and Christa 
McDermott Department of Psychology, University of Michigan DRAFT, 1 July 2007, Paper prepared for 
the International Society of Political Psychology annual meeting in Portland, Oregon, July 3-7, 2007. 
35   Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, supra note __, at 158-160. Like others who have engaged in twin research, 
the researchers’ basic premise is that because identical (monozygotic) twins are more genetically similar 
than dizyogotic twins, then with respect to a “trait that is at least partly heritable the tendency for [mz] 
twins to share that characteristic should be stronger than the tendency for [dz] twins.”  Id. at 155.   See also 
John R. Alford and John R. Hibbing, The Origin of Politics:  An Evolutionary Theory of Behavior, 2 
Perspectives on Politics 707 (2004). 
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then coded the responses as “conservative” or “liberal.”36  The researchers observe that 
while political issues and configurations vary considerably over time, basic divisions 
between liberal and conservatives perspectives are remarkably persistent.37  They 
accordingly posit two basic – and heritable – political orientations.  The first, which the 
researchers call “absolutist,” involves: 
a relatively strong suspicion of out-groups (e.g., immigrants), a yearning for in-
group unity and strong leadership, especially if there is an out-group threat (“Do 
not question the President while we are at war with terrorists”), a desire for clear, 
unbending moral and behavioral codes (strict constructionists), a fondness for 
swift and severe punishment for violations of this code (the death penalty), a 
fondness for systematization (procedural due process), a willingness to tolerate 
inequality (opposition to redistributive policies), and an inherently pessimistic 
view of human nature (life is “nasty, brutish, and short”).38 
 
The second, more “contextualist,” orientation is characterized by:  
Relatively tolerant attitudes toward out-groups, a desire to take a more context-
dependent rather than rule-based approach to proper behavior (substantive due 
process), an inherently optimistic view of human nature (people should be given 
the benefit of the doubt), a distaste for preset punishments (mitigating 
circumstances), a preference for group togetherness but not necessarily unity 
(“We can all get along even though we are quite different”), suspicion of 
hierarchy, certainty, and strong leadership (flip-flopping is not a character flaw), 
an aversion to inequality (e.g., support for a graduated income tax), and greater 
general empathic tendencies (rehabilitate, don’t punish).39 
 
They suggest that, to the degree that that political divisions correspond to these basic 
differences in orientation, they are likely to be more intractable than disagreements over 
policy.40  Their conclusions are supported by neurobioloigical research on brain 
processes, which show that conservatives like order and consistency and are better able to 
                                                 
36 Alford, Funk, and Hibbing, supra note -_, at 158 (explaining methodology), at 164-65 (describing cross-
cultural packages of issues considered liberal or conservative). 
37 Id. at 164. 
38 Id. at 164-65. 
39 Id. at 165. 
40 Id. at 165-66. 
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block out potentially distracting information, while liberals are better able to tolerate 
ambiguity and are more open to new information.41 
     Fourth, given these differences in orientation, the rhetoric and style of political 
debate has the potential to diffuse or inflame divisions.  Linguist George Lakoff, 
combining Norm Chomsky’s research on the deep structure of linguistics with more 
recent neuroscience findings, argued in his book Moral Politics that liberals and 
conservatives view the world through different metaphors about the relationship between 
the state and its citizens, and that these metaphors involve deeply rooted patterns of 
perception.  The language of political discourse then frames issues, consciously or 
unconsciously, in ways that trigger the metaphors, and the metaphors produce associated 
reactions that may have relatively little to do with the specific statement that triggered the 
response.42    
 Lakoff maintains that the contrasting metaphors track the paradigm role of parents 
with the family.43   Conservatives celebrate the “strict father” while liberals place greater 
value on the “nurturing mother.”  Those who share the Strict Father mentality see the 
world as dangerous; children need to be protected, and it is the responsibility of the strict 
father to impose discipline on his children.44  Children are born bad and learn through 
punishment.45   By contrast, the nurturant parent mentality views the world as basically 
                                                 
41   See Denise Gellene, Researchers Find Left-Wing Brain, Right-Wing Brain, L.A. Times, Sept. 10, 2007, 
at A11. 
42  GEORGE LAKOFF,  MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2D ED. 2002).  
43 GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT:  KNOW YOUR VALUES AND FRAME THE DEBATE (2004); 
MORAL POLITICS:  HOW LIBERALS AND CONSERVATIVES THINK (2d ed. 2002).  
44   Moral Politics; http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/nationasfamily/sfworldview.   
45  Interview of George Lakoff (2003), 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2003/10/27_lakoff.shtml. 
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safe, with parents responsible for nurturing their children with empathy and 
responsibility.46   
 Fifth, when political issues are framed in these terms, practically or 
metaphorically, they engender deeply held beliefs.   Such beliefs are less susceptible to 
argument, logic, or facts.  Indeed, cultural research suggests that within such arenas when 
empirical data conflicts with these beliefs, people reinterpret or deny the empirical 
findings rather than changes their views. 47 Consequently, when many people are 
confronted with new scientific information on issues that are “culturally disputed . . . men 
and women in white lab coats speak with less authority than (mostly) men and women in 
black frocks.”48 Attitudes toward homosexuality provide a clear example of this 
phenomenon.   Twice as many liberals as conservatives say that people are born 
homosexual, and 73% of committed white evangelicals think homosexuals can change 
their sexual orientation in contrast with two-thirds (66%) of seculars of all races who 
state that homosexuality cannot be changed. 49  The relationship between politics and the 
pulpit, with Protestant fundamentalist clerics emphasizing the evils of homosexuality 
more than mainline Protestant ministers or clergy in other religions, may reinforce 
cultural predispositions that are relatively impervious to change.50  New information on, 
for example, the genetic basis of homosexuality is thus likely to reinforce the beliefs of 
                                                 
46 Moral Politics; http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/nationasfamily/npworldview 
47 See, e.g., Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, and James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, Culture, and 
Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. Res. 283 (2005);  Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman, Cultural 
Cognition and Public Policy, 24 Yale Law & Policy Rev. 147, 163 (2006).see more generally 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/.    
48 Kahan and Braman, supra note __, at 165. 
49 THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN OPPOSITION 
TO HOMOSEXUALITY (2003), http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=37. 
50 Id. This does not necessarily mean, however, that causality is uni-dimensional.  As Kristin Luker 
observed, parishioners may seek out churches whose “sexual teachings support their own values, especially 
when they feel that their values were increasingly under assault in the larger culture.” 50   Kristin Luker, 
When Sex Goes to School 95-96 (2006). 
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those predisposed to tolerance rather than change the attitudes of those who see the 
conduct as an immoral choice.51 
While the tendency to filter data through existing belief systems is true of most 
human convictions, it may be particularly true of religious practices.  Scott Atran 
observes that one of the keys to understanding the role of religion is recognizing that 
religious belief requires taking ''what is materially false to be true'' and ''what is 
materially true to be false.''52   Rituals are critical to reinforcing such beliefs.  
Anthropologist Richard Sosis maintains that while both secular and religious rituals 
promote cooperation, religious rituals ''generate greater belief and commitment'' precisely 
because they depend on belief – and thus emotion -- rather than logic or proof.53   
Emotional commitment, Sosis believes, is deeper and longer-lasting than reason.54  It is 
also harder to question and, once instilled, harder to alter. These qualities, of course, 
make religion invaluable not only in instilling partisan loyalties, but also in encouraging 
responsible behavior.   
 Finally, political scientists who study the level of polarization in American 
politics find that while the views of the electorate have been remarkably stable over the 
last forty years, activists have become more partisan and more energized by issues 
                                                 
51 The science on this point remains speculative, however, with intriguing suggestions about the biological 
basis of homosexuality that do not, at this point, provide conclusive evidence about its etiology.  See 
Anthony F. Bogaret, et al, Biological Versus Nonbiological Older Brothers and Men's Sexual Orientation, 
103 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences . 10771 (2006)(summarizing literature and 
concluding that birth of older brothers increase incidence of male homosexuality). 
52 Henig, supra note __.  See also Scott Atran and Ara Norenzayan, Religion's Evolutionary Landscape: 
Counterintuition, Commitment, Compassion, Communion, 27 Beh. and Brain Sci. 713_(2004). 
53 For an empirical test of this proposition, see Bradley Ruffle and Richard Sosis, “Does it Pay to Pray? 
Costly Ritual and Cooperation, 7 B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 1 (2007) (religious males 
in Israel are more likely to cooperate than secular males). 
54 Henig, supra note  .   
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associated with “moral values.”55   These are the issues that have become critical  to the 
political distinctions between the devout and less devout, traditionalists and modernists, 
absolutists and contextualists, strict fathers v. nurturing mothers.  Abortion provides a 
paradigmatic example.56  Linguist George Lakoff explains:  
There are two classical kinds of cases [of women who want abortions].  
Unmarried teenage girls who have been having sex but have been careless or 
ignorant in the matter of birth control; women who want careers or independence 
lives . . . .According to Strict Father morality, an unmarried teenage girl should not 
be having teenage sex at all. . . . She has to be responsible for the consequence of her 
actions if she is to learn from her mistakes.  An abortion would simply sanction her 
immoral behavior.  .In both of the classical stereotypical cases, abortion violates 
Strict Father morality.57   
 
 These findings suggest that issues that fall on the dividing lines between the 
devout and the secular, and that evoke distinctions between more authoritarian and 
flexible political orientations, are likely to be among the more divisive topics on the 
political landscape.58  They are likely to be even more intense if either group finds that a 
                                                 
55 For a summary of the extensive political science literature on these issues, see DELIA BALDASSARRI AND 
ANDREW GELMAN, PARTISANS WITHOUT CONSTRAINT: POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND TRENDS IN 
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION, June 13, 2007, 
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/BGpolarization4.pdf (finding polarization on 
moral issues largely non-existent forty years ago, greater polarization today on moral issues among the 
better educated and more politically active, and polarization on moral issues increasing much more 
dramatically in since the mid-eighties) and EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND 
REALITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, HARVARD INSTITUTE ON ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 
Discussion Paper No. 2100, January 2006 (concluding that American political divisions have reverted to 
their pre-New Deal form, and have become increasingly religious and cultural).  See also John W. Evans, 
Have Americans’ Attitudes Become More Polarized?—An Update, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 71 (2004); MORRIS P. 
FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE, CULTURE WAR?  THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA. 
(2004). 
56 Abortion, however, does not have a single, fixed political meaning.  For a discussion of the 
transformation of the abortion use from one that primarily concerned observant Catholics to a broader 
symbol of changing family roles, see  Robert Post and Reva Siegel,  Roe Rage: Democratic 
Constitutionalism and Backlash,__ HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).  See also Evan, supra note 
__, at 17 (reporting that findings of polarization on the issue of abortion in various studies since the mid-
eighties). 
57 Lakoff, Moral Politics, supra note __, at 267-68.   
58 David Barnhizer suggests that the law, and courts, are at the center of the “seismic” cultural conflict, and 
that there has been little reasoned discourse from intellectuals on these issues.  David Barnhizer, Ideology, 
Propaganda and Legal Discourse in the Argument Culture (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=975256.  While law is central – control of national 
appropriations on teen education, for example, helps determine what teens actually learn – we see law as 
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particular issue goes to the core of its belief system.   Sexuality, particularly in the 
context of teen education about contraception, is one such area.   It thus poses difficult 
dilemmas in separating reasonable public policy choices from the imposition of religious 
– and partisan – views about the content of the good life.   
 The results of the 2004 election suggest that these differences in worldview have 
become important political markers.  In 2004, President Bush’s religious supporters were 
far more likely to emphasize the importance of social issues, while John Kerry’s 
supporters focused on economic issues.59  And, among Bush’s religious constituencies, 
most asserted that their faith was “more or about as important as other factors in their 
voting decision.” In contrast, “a majority of Kerry’s religious constituencies reported that 
their faith” was less important.60  In red states, that is, the states that voted Republican, 51 
percent of voters identified themselves as evangelical or born again, while the rate in blue 
states was 22 percent. 61  Indeed, one possible basis for George Bush’s win in 2004 was 
his appeal to traditional American values, an appeal that helped him win the red states.62  
                                                                                                                                                 
the result, rather than the catalyst, of the conflict.  The laws that exist reflect certain values; while they may 
promote the development of, or revolution against, those values, they exemplify the values of the winning 
position.  Moreover, we see more reasoned analysis from within and outside of the academy than does 
Professor Barnhizer.   
59 http://pewforum.org/docs/index.php?DocID=64     
60.  John C. Green et al., The American religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Election:  Increased 
Polarization 13, avail. at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/postelection.pdf. 
61 Alan Abramowitz and Kyle Saunders, Why Can’t We All Just Get Along?  The Myth of a Polarized 
America, 3 The Forum 1, 13 (2005), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=forum.  The authors used data from 
the American National Election Studies and national exit polls. 
62 The question of what determined the 2004 election, and how polarized the public is has engendered 
substantial commentary.  See generally  EDWARD L. GLAESER AND BRYCE A. WARD, MYTHS AND 
REALITIES OF AMERICAN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY 33-34 (2006), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874977 (noting “the continuum of states ranging 
from the poor conservative places of the south and east to the rich, liberal places of the coasts . . .  . 
[and] that American parties are increasing[sic] oriented around religion and culture rather than 
economics”);  STEVEN ANSOLABEHERE, JONATHAN RODDEN, AND JAMES M. SNYDER, JR., PURPLE 
AMERICA 3 (2005), http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=1266 (challenging the 
culture war argument and finding that most of the population can be characterized as moderate); Jacob 
S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Off-Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American 
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For those voters who thought moral values were the most important issue in the election, 
79% voted for George Bush.63  This constituency, which carries dramatically more clout 
in “red state” legislatures, also determines the content of state level policies toward the 
always contentious issue of sex education.64 
III. RELIGION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE: THE CASE OF 
ABSTINENCE EDUCATION 
 The regulation of sexuality has long been an area of contention,65 but it has not 
always been an arena of political contention.66  It is today.  State legislatures have 
increasingly tended to regulate teen sexuality, prescribing sex education curricula, access 
to contraception, and availability of abortion.  As the attached chart shows, states 
legislatures have been active over the last ten years, and they vary considerably in their 
adoption of laws regulating access to abortion, the morning after pill, parental 
involvement in teen decision-making, and the content and availability of sex education in 
                                                                                                                                                 
Democracy 42 (2005)(Republican partisan tactics, not a change in concern about moral values, 
determined the 2004 election). 
63 CBS News, Moral Values:  A Decisive Issue?  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/11/03/60II/main653593.shtml; but see David Brooks, The Value-
Votes Myth, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/opinion/06brooks.html?ex=1257483600&en=b4613533d9a1bdde&ei
=5090&partner=rssuserland 
64 We take no position on the 2004 election, except to note that it helps identify differences in world view 
that correspond to different positions on abstinence education.  For the connection, however, between the 
2004 vote and religious views, see John C. Green and Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, 8 
RELIGION IN THE NEWS  (2005), 
http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol8No1/WhyMoral%20ValuesDidCount.htm. 
65 For a classic debate on these issues, compare Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 11 (1972) 
(arguing for the enforcement of laws against homosexuality and prostitution on the ground that “every 
society has the right to conserve its own traditions, to preserve the practices that are distinctive to its 
culture”) with H.L.A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality 51, 52 (1963) (maintaining that the identification of 
fundamental values is fraught with peril and that societies can change without disintegrating). 
66 E.g., the Supreme Court observed in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986), that until 1961, all 
fifty states had laws banning sodomy.   See Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Context of 
Homosexual Activity, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 521, 525 (1986).   When the Court reversed Bowers in 
Lawrence v. Texas, it did so emphasizing that the laws against sodomy were not necessarily directed at 
same-sex sodomy, but at all non-procreative sexual activity, 539 U.S. 558, 569-70 (2003), and that an 
“emerging awareness” had changed attitudes toward regulation of sexual activity between consenting 
adults.  Id. at 572. 
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public schools.   Examining the relationship between adolescent sexuality and religion 
makes sense on a variety of different levels.  As Mark Regnerus points out: “religion—
together with peers, parent, and the media—remains a primary socialization agent of 
children and adolescents . . .[And] sex is a sphere of human behavior high in religious 
applicability . ..  it is a topic that has more religious relevance—or is more clearly 
addressed in most religious traditions – than many  other topics.”67 
 Not surprisingly, then, sex education has become a particularly contentious issue.  
Comprehensive sex education (also called “abstinence-plus”68), which includes 
information about birth control as well as abstinence, can be contrasted with abstinence 
education, which is concerned with only one type of sex education.  Abstinence 
education has been federally funded in the public schools since at least 1981, when 
Congress enacted the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA).69  The AFLA, which received 
$30.6 million in funding in 2006, focuses generally on adolescent sexuality issues, 
including pregnancy and parenting.70  The AFLA itself explicitly approves of, and 
solicits, the involvement of religious organizations in its programs on teen sexuality. 71  
Since 1997, notwithstanding its original mandate, all AFLA prevention have centered on 
abstinence education.72 
Abstinence education is funded through two additional sources.  Title V of the 
Social Security Act, enacted as part of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, included 
                                                 
67   Mark D. Regnerus, Forbidden Fruit:  Sex & Religion in the Lives of American Teenagers 6-7 (2007).  J 
68 Abstinence-plus is the common term for comprehensive sex education (a google search on September 6, 
2007 for the term abstinence-plus found 23,000 items)..  See, e.g., Carmen Solomon-Fears, Reducing Teen 
Pregnancy:  Adolescent Family Life and Abstinence Education Programs 6 (2004), avail. at 
http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/crsreports/crsdocuments/RS2087310042004.pdf (CRS Report for 
Congress). 
69  P.L. 97-35, (now codified at  42 U.S.C. 300z (2007)). 
70  See http://opa.osophs.dhhs.gov/titlexx/oapp.html.   
71   Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 606 (1988). 
72   Solomon-Fears, supra note __, at 3. 
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appropriations specifically designed for abstinence education programs, and the 
legislation defined abstinence education as: 
 an educational or motivational program that: 
(A) Has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, psychological, and health 
gains to be realized by abstaining from sexual activity; 
(B) Teaches abstinence from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected 
standard for all school age children; 
(C) Teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only certain way to 
avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, and other 
associated health problems; 
(D) Teaches that a mutually faithful monogamous relationship in context of 
marriage is the expected standard of human sexual activity; 
(E) Teaches that sexual activity outside of the context of marriage is likely to 
have harmful psychological and physical effects; 
(F) Teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful 
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society; 
(G) Teaches young people how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and 
drug use increases vulnerability to sexual advances; and 
(H) Teaches the importance of attaining self-sufficiency before engaging in 
sexual activity. 73  
Congress has allocated additional funds for abstinence education through 
appropriations for Community-Based Abstinence Education (CBAE),74 requiring that 
all programs teach every one of the items listed within the definition of abstinence 
education.75  CBAE funding is provided directly to recipient organizations, unlike 
Title V funding, which is provided to the state.76 Since 1997, all of the Adolescent and 
                                                 
73  42 U.S.C. 710(b)(2), a definition that has remained virtually unchanged since 1996.  Pub.L. 104- 193, 
Title IX, § 912, 110 Stat. 2353 (1996). 
74  Carmen Solomon-Fears, CRS Report for Congress, Reducing Teen Pregnancy  Adolescent Family Life 
and Abstinence Education Programs, Jan. 3, 2007; Legal Momentum, An Overview of Federal Abstinence 
only Funding 8 (2007),  http://www.legalmomentum.org/legalmomentum/publications/OverviewofAbs.pdf 
75 Amy Bleakley, et al., Public Opinion on Sex Education in US Schools, 160 Arch Pediatric Adolesc. Med. 
1151, 1151-1152 (2006).   
76 Christopher Trenholm et al, Impacts of Four Title Vi, Section 510 Abstinence Education Programs, Final 
Report 3 (2007), http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/PDFs/impactabstinence.pdf.  
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Family Life prevention projects have been abstinence only projects that complied with 
the definition in the Welfare Reform Act.77   
The amount of government funding for abstinence education increased from $10 
million in 1997 to $167 million in 2005 78 to $177 million in 2007.79   This funding is 
having an effect, at least on what is being taught.  Adolescents were far more likely to 
receive sex education that included only abstinence education in 2002 than in 1995.80   
 These programs address an issue – the regulation of adolescent sexuality – that 
for many of the reasons discussed above is intrinsically divisive, and they do so in a 
way that involves the fault line between religious and secular understandings, appeals 
to absolute versus contextual values, the reaffirmation of authority rather than 
empathy or autonomy.81   Moreover, abstinence education addresses a divide not only 
in symbolic values, but as a practical component in the different understandings of the 
transition to adulthood.  Accordingly, abstinence only education is a cultural flash 
point, and a locus for considering the role of religion in political and cultural conflicts.  
These conflicts play out at two levels: ideological identification along traditionalist 
                                                 
77 http://www.hutchison.senate.gov/RS20873.pdf 
78 Laura Duberstein Lindberg, John S. Santelli, and Susheela Singh, Changes in Formal Sex Education:  
1995-2002, 38 Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health (2006), available at  
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3818206.html.   
79   Carmen Solomon-Fears, Scientific Evaluation of Approaches to Prevent Teen Pregnancy  4 (2007), 
avail. at http://opencrs.cdt.org/rpts/RS22656_20070501.pdf. 
80  Id.  The authors report that the percentage of males receiving only such education increase  from 9% to 
24% [and for] females, from 8% to 21%).”   
81 Even contentious issues, however, have more versus less divisive components.  As Mary Ann Glendon 
observed in Abortion and Divorce in Western Law, European legislatures tended to limit abortion to cases 
necessary to save the life of the mother, but permitted implementation that treated emotional distress at the 
prospect of carrying the child to term as a threat to the mother’s health.  The result permitted extension of 
the practice without the “moral affront” to those who opposed abortion in principle.  It can also be termed 
hypocritical in shielding the practice from public view. 
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versus contextualist lines, and geographic differences in the socialization of the next 
generation. 
A. Sex as an Ideological Marker 
 All societies regulate sexuality, and instillation of norms channeling sexual energy 
requires considerable societal effort.82   Nonetheless, these efforts do not always 
command consensus support.  Kristin Luker, in her fascinating examination of the 
approaches of several communities to sex education, found a “chasm, wide and growing 
wider, between the sexual right and left.”83   She was trying to understand why people, 
raised in the same general cultural environments, become sexual liberals or sexual 
conservatives.84  She characterized sexual conservatives, who typically opposed sex 
education other than abstinence education, as “Old Testament types . . .[who] believe in a 
moral code derived from God, not man,” while sexual liberals, who favored more 
comprehensive forms of sex education, “have a more forgiving view of morality.”85    
Consequently, for sexual conservatives, nonmarital sex is “wrong because the Bible says 
it is,”86 while liberals are more fact oriented.   Sexual liberals tended to see their 
opposition, in non-neutral terms, as “Christian.”87   Sexual conservatives were, in fact, 
more likely to attend church, and to attend theologically conservative churches at that, 88 
but Luker emphasizes the complex relationship between sex and religion.  She observes 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy 106-09 (Oxford University Press 1986); Sarah Blaffer 
Hrdy, Mother Nature: Maternal Instincts and How They Shape the Human Species 252 (2000)(the rise of 
monogamy required "elaborate modes of socialization, rituals, and whole mythologies ... to endorse male 
control over the inconvenient sexual legacy that women inherited from their primate ancestors.") 
83 Kristin Luker, When Sex Goes to School 91-91 (2006)(emphasis in original). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 184, 92 
86 Luker, at 156. 
87 Id. at 124. 
88 Luker, supra note -_, at 144. 
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that sexual conservatives actively sought churches whose sexual teachings supported 
their own, “especially when they felt their values were increasingly under assault in the 
larger culture.”89  In contrast, sexual liberals, even if they were church attending 
Christians, tended to regard the sexual conservatives as narrow-minded and intolerant90 
and to prefer neighborhoods and congregations closer to their own views. 
Taking these differences together, Luker concluded that sex, for the conservatives, is 
sacred, while, for the liberals, it is natural.91   Sacred sex requires formal structures such 
as marriage to protect it.   Sexual conservatives accordingly champion the unity of sex, 
marriage and procreation, with marriage as the institution ordained by God to unite 
sexual pleasure with responsible family life and sex outside marriage sinful and 
profane.92   Natural sex, in contrast, is to be enjoyed; it needs to be protected from the 
worry and anxiety that come from sexual restrictions and guilt.93  For sexual liberals, it is 
also not a defining component of family life – that rests more heavily on commitment, 
companionship, communication and mutual respect.94  Moreover, sexual liberals, with 
their emphasis on instrumental, contextual moral reasoning, “see no sense in (and are 
deeply skeptical about) asking young people not to be sexual for a decade or two, if not 
more.”95  Precisely because they, too, see marriage as important to realization of a full 
life, they believe it should come relatively late in life, and not by accident, but by plan.96 
These differences in attitudes toward sexuality, of course, correspond to more 
general differences between conservative and liberal, devout and secular orientations.  
                                                 
89 Id. at 95-96. 
90 Id. at 124. 
91 Id. at 99. 
92 Id. at 102. 
93 Id. at 100. 
94 Id. at 103, 105. 
95 Id. at 103. 
96 Id. 
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Most religions, and particularly fundamentalist ones, tend to preach against non-marital 
sexuality. 97  And if non-marital sexuality is wrong, absolutists believe that schools 
should take a consistent position against it.  They cannot reconcile teaching abstinence 
with providing information about birth control.  As Mark Regnerus found in his 
comprehensive study of sex education, parents who are “more devoutly religious” are 
worried that discussing contraception will encourage their children to engage in sexual 
activities.98  Moreover, they emphasize the importance of adherence to authority, and 
reinforcement of the moral order.99    Conservative churches, in turn, solidify support for 
raising the priority accorded sexual issues on the political agenda.  Sexual liberals, in 
contrast, emphasize individual autonomy and fulfillment.   They see sexual practices 
along a continuum of possibilities, and education designed to assist the responsible 
exercise of choice.100   They place a higher premium on tolerance, and view sexuality per 
se as an issue best addressed outside of the political arena.101   
The rhetoric surrounding the renewal of Section V funding in 2007 shows these 
different influences at work.  One commenter rued the “seeming reluctance of Christians 
to speak out about premarital, extramarital and other sexual sin,”102 while Rep. John 
Boehner, the Republican Minority Leader, in seeking to extend Title V funding, used a 
letter from the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops warning about the failure to renew 
                                                 
97 Gary J. Simson & Erika A. Sussman, Keeping the Sex in Sex Education:  The First Amendment’s 
Religion Clauses and the Sex Education Debate, 9 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 265, 284-291 (2000); 
but see Helen M. Alvare, Saying “Yes” Before Saying “I Do”:  Premarital Sex and Cohabitation as a Piece 
of  the Divorce Puzzle, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics, & Pub. Poly 7, 77-82 (2004).  SIECUS has charged that 
“abstinence only-until-marriage” curricula are “based on religious beliefs, rely on fear and shame . . “  
Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States, SIECUS REVIEWS FEAR-BASED, 
ABSTINENCE ONLY-UNTIL-MARRIAGE Curricula,  http://www.siecus.org/reviews.html (2005). 
98 Regnerus, Forbidden Fruit, supra note __, at 204. 
99 Luker, supra note , at 136. 
100 Luker, supra note __, at 104. 
101 Id. at 103. 
102 James Regions, Controversy over Abstinence part of Larger Purity Question, Springfield News-Leader, 
May 8, 2007, at 2B. 
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the funding.103  Conversely, the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action 
League rallies opponents of abstinence education around the heading “ideology over 
science.”104   
B. Demography and Anxiety 
Ideology and symbolism aside, abstinence education also involves different 
understandings of the transition to adulthood.  While, as Luker underscores, conservative 
versus liberal divisions exist within all communities, cultural differences play out at the 
community level in the creation of consensus norms, and states constitute the relevant 
political units for the implementation of sex education policies.105  The last election 
showed states deeply divided, culturally and politically, with the priority given to “moral 
values,” an important marker of the divisions.106  These differences correspond, however, 
not just to different values, but to different underlying patterns in family formation.  
                                                 
103   Cheryl Wetzstein, Abstinence-Only on Shaky Ground; Program funding Threatened Despite Parental 
Support in Polls, Wash. Times, May 29, 2007, at A5. 
104 NARAL: Pro-Choice America, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/issues/sex-education/, last visited 
September 5, 2007. 
105 For a discussion of the relationship between state family law, national constitutional norms and religion, 
see Vivian Hamilton, PRINCIPLES OF U.S. FAMILY LAW, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 31 (2006). 
106 Pollsters included “moral values” for the first time on a list of issues of concern to voters in the 2004 
election.  Moral values headed the list of voter concerns by a narrow plurality, with Bush voters 
dramatically more likely to list moral values as their top concern than Kerry voters. The other issues 
included the economy, terrorism, Iraq, taxes, education, and health care.  See CNN.com, Election Results 
(2005), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html.  Commentators 
differed as to the role of moral values in determining the outcome of the 2004 election, but the analysis 
most closely analyzing the moral values vote identified it, as this article does, with the intensity of religious 
commitment.  John C. Green and Mark Silk, Why Moral Values Did Count, 8 RELIGION IN THE NEWS  
(2005), http://www.trincoll.edu/depts/csrpl/RINVol8No1/WhyMoral%20ValuesDidCount.htm.  Moreover, 
in the regions that Bush carried, a higher percentage of Bush voters (two-fifths or more) ranked moral 
values as their top concern, while Kerry carried the regions in which Bush voters ranked moral values as a 
lesser concern.  Accordingly, the moral values vote served as something of regional marker, and did so to a 
greater degree than other top voter concerns.  Id.   
Nonetheless, the states form something of a continuum, albeit with clear regional differences, 
particularly in the concentration of Democratic states.  We have discussed the divisions elsewhere, 
identifying the core “blue” or Democratic regions with the New England, mid-Atlantic and West Coast 
states (California, Oregon and Washington).  The rest of the country was red, with the most intensely red 
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Barbara Dafoe Whitehead has described the changes nationally as new “pathways to 
adulthood;”107 we have termed the changes the “new middle class morality.”108   
Increasing emphasis on education has produced, at least for the middle class, later ages of 
marriage and first birth.109  The result for the country as a whole is a larger gap between 
the beginning of sexual activity and marriage.   Whitehead reports that the average age of 
first intercourse for 17 for women, 16 for men, while the average age of marriage is 25 
for women and 26 for men.110   Delaying sexual activity until the mid-twenties (and later 
for the college educated) is unrealistic at best.  The result for sexual liberals, blue states, 
and the upwardly mobile middle class is greater emphasis on contraception, and in many 
cases abortion as the fallback.111  These changes present a direct affront to religious 
sensibilities, as both sexual practices have changed and community support for tradition 
moral understandings have atrophied.112  The results play out along geographic lines.  
Brad Wilcox reports that, religion aside: 
red state teens tend to hail from less-educated, working-class homes where 
childbearing at an early age is not a big deal and a long-term orientation to life is 
in short supply.  Red state teens seem to feel as if they don't have much to lose if 
                                                                                                                                                 
areas including the mountain west states of Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming, the central plains (Nebraska, 
Kansas, the Dakotas, Texas and Oklahoma), the South and border states.  Battleground states, in contrast, 
included the mid-West (e.g., Ohio, Iowa and Pennsylvania), and the Southwest states of New Mexico and 
Nevada.  CNN, supra, and Green and Silk, supra. 
107 Barbara DaFoe Whitehead, Trends Shaping Youthful Sexuality, 
http://www.nplc.org/commonground/papers/whiteheadpaper.htm. 
108 See June Carbone, “Is Fertility the Unspoken Issue in the Debate Between Liberal and Conservative 
Family Values?” 3 Law & Social Inquiry 809–839 (2007). 
109 For a more thorough consideration of the relationship between class advantage and age of family 
formation, see Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring After the Second 
Demographic Transformation, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 607 (2004)(finding that for the upper quarter of 
women, determined by education, the average age of first birth has risen from 26 in 1970 to 32 today, and 
the children born to better educated women are overwhelming raised in two parent families, while the rate 
of single parent families has increased dramatically for the rest of the population). 
110 Id. 
111 For a comprehensive discussion of these changes, see Carbone and Cahn, Red Families v. Blue 
Families, ssrn.  
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they give in to their passions--especially if sex occurs with someone they view as 
a potential marital partner.  More generally, as Thomas Sowell has observed, the 
"redneck" culture of the working-class South does not foster restraint in general 
and, more particularly, in matters sexual. 113   
The great irony is that while red states may be more religious and more committed to 
traditional values, they are also more likely to produce teen births, early marriage and 
subsequent divorce.   The incongruity then between belief and practice raises the level of 
cultural anxiety, reinforcing the perceived importance of moral teachings about the 
unacceptability of non-marital sex.     
Moreover, while Luker emphasizes that all communities have sexual liberals and 
conservatives, the causal factors that Wilcox identifies -- wealth, class, religion, and their 
corresponding impact on age of family formation and sexual practices – vary by 
region.114  They accordingly contribute to the formation of different underlying 
understandings in different states.   The relationship among the factors is complex; 
wealthier states produce better educated citizens who are less religious and marry at later 
ages.115  They may be wealthier because they are better educated or better educated 
because they are wealthier, but the factors tend to be reinforcing and self-perpetuating 
irrespective of the direction in which causality runs.  This section examines them in turn 
in an effort, not to untangle causation, but to create a cultural snapshot of the factors that 
influence liberal versus conservative attitudes toward abstinence education. 
                                                 
113 W. Bradford Wilcox, Hormonographics  
Red states, blue states, and sex before marriage, The Weekly Standard, May 28, 2007. 
114 See infra notes  . 
115 See infra notes  . 
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  Contrary to historical patterns, greater wealth today correlates with greater support 
for Democrats.116  The five states with the highest median household income in 2004 
were New Jersey, Connecticut, Maryland, Alaska and Massachusetts – all but Alaska 
were blue states concentrated in the New England and mid-Atlantic regions. 117  The five 
top states by median family income were about the same: New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Maryland, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, with Alaska falling to sixth, making the 
sweep of northeastern states complete.118 
The poorest states by median household income were West Virginia, Mississippi, 
Arkansas, Louisiana and Montana (with Kentucky in a dead heat with Montana for the 
fifth spot), and Mississippi, Arkansas, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana by 
median family income.119   All are red states (though New Mexico only narrowly), and all 
are concentrated in the South or mountain regions (though New Mexico is more 
characteristic of the Southwest).120  The percentages of families below the poverty line 
shows a similar picture, with the greatest percentages in Mississippi, New Mexico, 
Louisiana, Arkansas and West Virginia, and the fewest in Minnesota, New Hampshire, 
Alaska, Vermont and New Jersey (all blue except for Alaska).121    
The differences in wealth, as Wilcox observes, may influence time horizons: those 
with more to look forward to may be more likely to postpone immediate pleasures.  One 
                                                 
116 This does not necessarily mean that individuals with higher incomes are more likely to be Democrats.  
See Hacker and Pierson, supra, at 194-95 (Republican policies tend to favor wealthy elites). 
117U.S. Census Bureau, The 2007 Statistical Abstract of the United States, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/income_expenditures_wealth/.  The 2007 Statistical Abstract Is 
the source for the other statistics on wealth and poverty in this paragraph.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
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might expect religious observance, with its focus on the hereafter, to push back those 
time horizons.122  At a wholesale level, however, it does not.123  The states with the 
highest level of religious participation do not, by reason alone, result in either less 
poverty or delayed childbearing.124   The five states with the highest level of church 
attendance are among the poorest and reddest: South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Utah and Arkansas.125  Utah is wealthier than the others, and the only state outside the 
South.  The five states with the lowest level of church attendance are Vermont, New 
Hampshire, Nevada, Maine and Massachusetts -- with all but Nevada in New England, 
and all but Nevada voting blue (albeit with very close margins in New Hampshire and 
Nevada).126 
Age of family formation completes the regional map.  The age of legal marriage in 
most states is 18.127  In the United States, the median age of marriage for women is 25.1, 
                                                 
122 For a different view of the relationship between class and religion, see Candace Alcorta and Richard 
Sosis, Rituals, Emotion, and Sacred Symbols: The Evolution of Religion as an Adaptive Complex, 16 
Human Nature 323, 339-40, 345 (2005), arguing that greater tests of commitment are imposed on lower 
status males to maintain religious membership, but that such males also gain more in status from group 
membership and experience less cognitive dissonance from participation in a society in which they cannot 
share in higher status.. 
123 Of course, the converse may be true.  Robert Wurthrow indicates that education is the single biggest 
factor distinguishing religious conservatives from religious liberals, with one in three college graduates 
believing that the Bible is literally true compared to twice as many of those with high school degrees.  
Robert Wurthrow, The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith Since World War II 168-69 
(1988).  It is, of course, possible that those who are poorer also tend to be less educated and more religious, 
with shorter time horizons because of their poverty and/or lack of education.   
124  See infra nn. 131-32. 
125   The statistics in this paragraph re church attendance are drawn from Appendix A.  For  the rankings of 
comparative wealth between states, see U.S. Census Bureau, Personal Income Per Capita in Current 
Dollars, 2005, avail. at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/ranks/rank29.htm.  As to whether a state 
voted red or blue in 2004, see Cahn and Carbone, supra note __.  
126 Id. 
127 All but two states require couples to be 18 to marry without parental consent.  “Marriage Laws in the 
United States – By Age, Cool Nurse, http://www.coolnurse.com/marriage_laws.htm (May 2003), last 
visited September 9, 2007. 
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while for men it is 26.7.128  This has changed dramatically since 1960, when the median 
age at first marriage was 20.3 for women, and 22.8 for men.129    Today, the five states 
with the lowest median age of marriage are Utah, Oklahoma, Idaho, Arkansas, and 
Kentucky (all but Arkansas voting for Bush over Kerry by more than 20 percentage 
points).130  Correspondingly, the states with the highest median age of marriage are 
Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Jersey (including four of 
the top six blue states).131  Age of first birth complements the marriage figures, with the 
same regional split.  In 2000, Massachusetts had the highest mean age for a mother’s first 
birth, at 27.8, followed by Connecticut (27.2), New Jersey (27.1), New Hampshire (26.7), 
and New York (26.4) (with all but New York also among the top five in family income).  
The lowest ages at first birth were in Mississippi (22.5), followed by Arkansas (22.7), 
Louisiana and New Mexico (23.0), Oklahoma (23.1), and Wyoming (23.2) (four of the 
top five among the poorest states in family income).132  Over the past 30 years, all states 
have experienced an increase in the mean age of mothers at which the first child is born, 
but the changes have been greatest in the northeast and smallest in Utah.133  
Childbearing patterns, of course, reflect a combination of the level of sexual activity, 
the acceptability of teen births and marriage, and access to contraception and abortion.  
                                                 
128 Tallese Johnson and Jane Dye, Indicators of Marriage and Fertility in the United States from the 
American Community Survey: 2000 to 2003, Table 1 (2005), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/fertility/mar-fert-slides.html.   
129   Infoplease, Median Age at First marriage, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0005061.html.  On the 
other hand, in 1890, the median age of first marriage for men was 26.1, and 22.0 for women. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 T.J. Mathews and Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother, 1970-2000 10 (Table 3) (2002), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr51/nvsr51_01.pdf.  
133 Id.  Looking at just the nineties, however, the areas with the biggest jump in age of first birth were D.C., 
Mass., Michigan, New Hampshire and New Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia.  The states with the least 
change were Wyoming and Alaska, which showed declines in age, New Mexico, which stayed the same, 
and South Dakota and North Dakota. 
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Focusing on teen births, the five states with the lowest rates were New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Maine – all blue New England states. 134  In 
contrast, the states with the highest teen birth rates were red Texas, New Mexico, 
Mississippi, Arizona, and Arkansas, with Latino immigration skewing teen birth rates in 
the Southwest. 135  A gauge on the acceptability of teen birth (or perhaps the 
unacceptability of birth control and/or abortion) may be the percentage of teen births 
within marriage.  The states with the highest percentages of teen birth taking place within 
marriage are Idaho, where only 64% of teen births are non-marital, Utah, with 66%, 
Texas, with 73%, and Colorado, Kentucky, and Wyoming, each with 74%.136   These 
states, which are concentrated in the mountain West, appear to encourage family 
formation – in terms of both marriage and childbirth – at earlier ages. 
Analysis of the increasing delay in marriage and childbearing, which has happened 
faster and more dramatically in the blue states, underscores the correlation with wealth 
and class.  Wilcox, for example, argues that:  
blue state teens from middle- and upper-class homes may be "sexually tolerant" but 
also "perceive a bright future for themselves, one with college, advanced degrees, a 
career, and a family." They view early and especially unprotected sex as a potential 
threat to their plans for the future . . . . And so blue state teens--especially mainline 
Protestant and Jewish teens from well-heeled homes--tend to delay intercourse, even 
as they dabble in oral sex and pornography at higher rates than their red state peers.  
Wilcox emphasizes further that because of “their strategic orientation,” blue state teens 
who engage in intercourse (as most do before they turn 20), “are much more likely to rely 
                                                 
134 Child Trends, Teen Birth Rates Ranked Lowest to Highest, 2003, 
http://www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2006StatebyState.pdf. 
135 Id. 
136  ChildTrends, Facts at a Glance, Table 1 (2006), http://www.childtrends.org/Files/FAAG2006.pdf 
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on contraception than their red state peers, often with the winking or open support of 
parents and local educators. . .”137  He concludes:  
The strategic approach to sex found among well-off blue state teens certainly has its 
merits: Among other things, they are much less likely to have a baby outside 
wedlock, to marry before they are ready for the responsibilities of family life, and to 
get divorced, than are working-class teens from red states. Their strategic approach to 
sex and especially reproduction gives them a leg up in their drive for professional and 
familial success.138 
 
What Wilcox does not fully discuss is the application of these principles to those 
unlikely to realize middle class restraint.  Some studies suggest that, controlling for other 
factors, religious teens may delay the beginning of sexual activity, but not necessarily 
until marriage.139   At the same time, teens in the same community, who do not share the 
depth of religious beliefs, may engage in sexual activities earlier than the religious teens, 
but without as ready access to birth control or abortion as the teens in blue communities 
more tolerant of sexual activity.140  The result may exacerbate the problems associated 
with early pregnancy whether or not religious teachings succeed in reducing the overall 
level of sexual activity.  Moreover, the resulting pregnancies may in turn reinforce the 
disadvantages to the children born to parents not yet ready to assume the responsibilities 
of parenting.141   Lower levels of education or wealth may then in turn influences the 
                                                 
137 Wilcox, Hormonographics, supra.. 
138 Id. 
Red states, blue states, and sex before marriage, The Weekly Standard, May 28, 2007. 
139 See, e.g., Karin L. Brewster, Elizabeth C. Cooksey, David K. Guilkey, and Ronald R. Rindfuss, The 
Changing Impact of Religion on the Sexual and Contraceptive Behavior of Adolescent Women in the 
United States, 60 Journal of Marriage and the Family 493 (1998)(the sexual activity of white Protestant 
fundamentalist teens fell during the eighties, but contraceptive use by religious teens was less than for non-
religious teens).   
140 For a summary of states laws permitting refusal to provide contraceptive services, see GUTTMACHER 
INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES (2005), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf.  For a discussion of the impact of abstinence 
education on use of contraception, see notes __ infra. 
141 See McLanahan, supra, documenting disparities. 
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religious and political predispositions of the next generation.   Within this context, teen 
births, not teen sex, may be the most critical issue in determining the cultural milieu that 
shapes the next generation. 
IV. The Intersection of Law and Culture 
 Abstinence education, while it supports the moral understandings of religious 
conservatives, might be defended in secular terms.  The Heritage Foundation, for 
example, argues that “[t]he harmful effects of early sexual activity are well documented. 
They include sexually transmitted diseases, teen pregnancy, and out-of-wedlock 
childbearing.”142   Liberals and conservatives might applaud programs designed to delay 
the beginning of sexual experimentation, and prevent unwanted pregnancies and sexually 
transmitted diseases.  The overwhelming evidence, however, is that abstinence only 
programs are less effective than comprehensive sex education programs in doing so. 
In a careful review of data from the National Survey of Family Growth published in the 
American Journal of Public Health, the authors examined the bases for the declining 
teenage pregnancy rate from 1995-2002.143  The researchers found: the rate of sexual 
intercourse for 15-17 year-olds declined by about 10%, while it remained fairly stable for 
18-19 year olds; the pregnancy risk for 15-17 year olds fell by 55%, while it declined by 
27% for 18-19 year olds; the rate of condom use by 15-17 year olds increased by 20%, 
from 38% to 58%, while it increased from 34% to 50% for 18-19 year olds; and the 
researchers demonstrated that 14% of the change in pregnancy risk for 15-19 year olds 
                                                 
142 Melissa G. Pardue, More Evidence of the Effectiveness of Abstinence Education Programs, May 5, 
2003, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/wm738.cfm 
143   John S. Santelli, et al., Explaining Recent Declines in Adolescent Pregnancy in the United States The 
Contribution of Abstinence and Increased Contraceptive Use, 97  Am. J. Pub. Health  150, 1152-154 
(2007), avail. at 
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was a decline in the number of sexually active young women, while 86% of the decrease 
resulted from changes in contraceptive use.144  In an April 2007 comprehensive review of 
Title V programs that was authorized by Congress, the authors found that youth who 
participated in abstinence education programs were no more nor less likely to have 
abstained from sex than those in a control group who had not received the abstinence 
education programs.145  The study randomly assigned more than 2,000 youths to an 
abstinence education program group or to a control group; four to six years after the 
study began, the researchers also found virtually no differences between the age of first 
sexual intercourse and the rate of unprotected sex for those who had received abstinence 
education compared to those in the control group.146  The authors reported:   “Findings 
from this study provide no evidence that abstinence programs implemented in upper 
elementary and middle schools are effective at reducing the rate of teen sexual activity 
several years later,” although, as the authors noted,  the study provided no evidence 
concerning programs implemented at earlier or later ages.147 
 In 2005, the American Psychological Association also reviewed the existing 
scientific literature and concluded that abstinence only education programs have limited 
effectiveness in encouraging abstinence, and unintended consequences.   Based on fifteen 
years of research, the APA report concluded that comprehensive sex education programs 
that included abstinence education with information about birth control were at least as 
effective in discouraging early sexual activity and more effective in reducing pregnancies 
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and sexually transmitted diseases.148   Similarly, a Center for Disease Control study 
released in 2002 indicated that five of the government funded comprehensive sex 
education programs appeared to produce successful results compared to none of the 
abstinence only programs.149  Congressman Henry Waxman, in a report examining the 
federally funded programs concluded that over eighty percent of federal grants go to 
providing abstinence only curricula that "contain false, misleading, or distorted 
information about reproductive health." 150  Moreover, other studies have shown the 
incidence of abstinence, even if it reduces or delays sexual intercourse, to increase the 
risk of sexually transmitted diseases as teens engage in unprotected oral or anal sex.151   
 In this context, the primary reason for adopting abstinence only programs becomes 
religious or ideological,152 not child protection  First, as we have noted above, absolutist 
approaches place an emphasis on consistency.  If non-marital sex is wrong, then the 
ineffectiveness of the programs in delaying sexuality does not itself justify a shift to 
programs that appear to sanction non-marital sexuality by providing greater access to 
                                                 
148 Resolution In Favor of Empirically Supported Sex Education and HIV Prevention Programs for 
Adolescents, American Psychological Association, February 18-20 (2005)  
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149 CDC, Programs That Work (archived version online at http://web.archive.org/web/20010606142729/ 
www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dash/rtc/index.htm). 
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See  Robert Rector & Kirk A. Johnson, Adolescent Virginity Pledges and Risky Sexual Behaviors (June 14, 
2005), http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/whitepaper06142005-2.cfm. 
152 For a critique of the programs in these terms, see James McGrath, Abstinence only Adolescent 
Education: Ineffective, Unpopular, and Unconstitutional 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 665, 687-89 (2004). 
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contraception.153  Second, abstinence only programs may be a way of promoting more 
traditional values generally.  Those most likely to choose to implement such programs are 
often faith-based or allied with faith-based groups, in part, because groups that do not 
share such religious commitments are unlikely to seek to promote abstinence only 
programs.154 Third, the programs may also reinforce patterns that lock in more traditional 
ways of life.   A lack of access to effective contraception promotes early marriage, either 
as a deliberate choice or as a response to an improvident pregnancy.  Early marriages in 
turn tend to reinforce traditional gender roles, and greater emphasis on traditional family 
understandings.  In the modern era, these early marriages are also more likely to end in 
divorce.155  Abstinence only programs thus reflect the values and life choices of one side, 
and only one-side of a cultural divide. 
 It is accordingly unsurprising that implementation varies by region.  In Title V of 
the Social Security Act, one of the dedicated abstinence education earmarks, states decide 
whether to participate, and, during the past several years, five states have refused 
potential federal funding for abstinence education pursuant to this program.156   The five 
                                                 
153 Of course, married couples may also use contraception, but programs effective at encouraging 
contraception provide information not just about their operation, but about ways of obtaining them.  
154Heritage Community Services in South Carolina, for example,  includes the following testimonial on its 
website: “The principle-based curriculum taught by Heritage teachers compliments [sic] the Biblical 
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states – California, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin157 – are all blue.158   
The differences in approach reflect and are likely to reinforce cultural variation by region. 
 Legal challenges to the programs have focused overwhelming on the second 
prong in this analysis – the use of federal funds to promote faith-based groups.  The 
cultural divide we have described, however, involves the first and third to a much 
greater degree.  Nonetheless, the programs’ strong religious associations provide a 
richer legal target.  In one of the more important cases to examine the permissibility of 
government funding for religious-based service organizations, the Court rejected a 
challenge to the inclusion of faith-based organizations as potential fundees pursuant to 
the Adolescent Family Life Act.159   The AFLA explicitly recognizes the potential use 
of religious organizations as potential support systems for families dealing with 
adolescent pregnancy, and authorizes federal funding for eligible religious 
organizations.  The majority held that the purpose of the statute was secular, and it 
anticipated that religious organizations could comply with the statutory mandate 
without religious indoctrination.  In a strong dissent, Justice Blackmun (joined by 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens) noted that “the religious significance in the 
counseling provided by some grantees . . .is a dimension that Congress specifically 
                                                 
157 Kaiser Family Foundation, Daily Women’s Health Policy, Mar. 6, 2007, available at 
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sought to capture by enlisting the aid of religious organizations.” 160  As the dissent 
noted, various religious organizations will provide differing answers to questions of 
how an adolescent should handle her pregnancy.161  Further, although the Court had 
previously upheld providing aid to religious organizations which were administering 
social welfare programs, in this case, the dissent noted: 
There is a very real and important difference between running a soup 
kitchen or a hospital, and counseling pregnant teenagers on how to make the 
difficult decisions facing them. The risk of advancing religion at public expense, 
and of creating an appearance that the government is endorsing the medium and 
the message, is much greater when the religious organization is directly engaged 
in pedagogy, with the express intent of shaping belief and changing behavior, 
than where it is neutrally dispensing medication, food, or shelter.162 
Unlike the majority, the dissent was highly skeptical that religious attitudes toward 
counseling pregnant adolescents could be disentangled from the secular counseling 
purposes for which the federal grant had been received. 
In two subsequent cases brought by the American Civil Liberties Union against 
specific service providers alleging that the abstinence education programs promote 
religion, the parties have entered into consent decrees that carefully establish the 
boundaries of acceptable language and religious messages.  In 2002, the ACLU sued 
the Louisiana Governor’s Program on Abstinence, claiming that, in a variety of ways, 
it promoted religion through its own programs, that it funded organizations which 
transmitted religious messages, and which were primarily sectarian, rather than 
                                                 
160 Bowen, 487 U.S. at 625, 639 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).  For purposes of this paper, the outcome of the 
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secular.163  The Louisiana “programs that were going out and saying, you know, “get 
saved by Jesus, sponsored by the governor's program on abstinence.” 164  Two months 
after the suit was filed, the court entered a preliminary injunction that prohibited the 
state from funding any religious activities and “pervasively sectarian institutions,” and 
required the state to develop a monitoring mechanism to guarantee that abstinence 
education funds were not used for religious purposes.165  Shortly thereafter, the state 
and the ACLU entered into a settlement agreement in which the state promised to 
clarify that government-sponsored abstinence programs could not include religious 
messages or promote religion in any way.166  The state also agreed to investigate any 
allegation that abstinence programs had religious content. 167   The ACLU returned to 
court in 2005, claiming violations of the settlement agreement because “the governor's 
program continues to feature religious materials on its official website, 
AbstinenceEdu.com. State-appointed experts advise readers, for example, that 
"abstaining from sex until entering a loving marriage will . . . [make you] really, truly, 
'cool' in God's eyes" and that "God is standing beside you the whole way" if you 
                                                 
163 Complaint, avail. at Roundtable on Religion & Social Welfare Policy (Profs. Ira C. Lupu and Robert 
Tuttle), ACLU of Louisiana v. Foster, available at 
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167 As Professors Lupu and Tuttle explain, “In American Civil Liberties Union of Louisiana v. Foster, a 
court held unconstitutional a grant to faith-based organizations that provided sexual abstinence education, 
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The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitiution, 55 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 86 (2005). 
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commit to abstinence.”  168   This time, the judge upheld the religious content of the 
state’s website, finding no excessive entanglement.169 
A second suit, filed three years later, concerned funds appropriated to the Silver 
Ring Thing (SRT)170 as part of a special Congressional earmark.  The ACLU of 
Massachusetts accused the federal government of providing a “direct government 
grant to a pervasively sectarian institution . . .[with] federal dollars [] demonstrably 
underwriting religions activities and religious content.”171  Among other allegations, 
the ACLU asserted that each Silver Ring was inscribed with a verse from the New 
Testament, and was accompanied by a SRT Bible; that the SRT 12-step follow-up 
program included the SRT student acknowledging that “God has a plan for his or her 
life, and a plan for his or her sexuality;”172 and that the SRT Newsletter included 
information such as: “’more people are becoming part of this abstinence phenomenon.  
And ultimately, they are developing a relationship with Jesus Christ.  This is such 
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to understand that abstinence until marriage is not only God's plan for their lives, but also the best 
and only way to avoid the harmful physical and emotional effects of premarital sex. By offering a 
message of forgiveness and new beginnings the program reaches out to those teens that have 
become sexually active & offers an opportunity to embrace a "second virginity." 
http://www.silverringthing.com/about.html.  
171 www.aclu.org/FILESPDFs, ACLY v. Leavitt, Complaint, para. 1. 
172   Id., para. 51. 
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good news.’”173  Three months after the filing of the SRT lawsuit, HHS withheld 
funding of the remaining $75,000 of the SRT’s $1.2 million.174   
The parties entered into a settlement agreement pursuant to which SRT agreed 
that, if it sought further funding, it would certify its compliance with applicable 
federal regulations, which prohibit using federal funds to support “inherently religious 
activities.”175  The Department of Health and Human Services sent a list of 
“Safeguards Required” if SRT sought additional federal money; the safeguards 
included requiring that abstinence education programs with religious content 
constitute separate and distinct programs from those funded by federal money, 
including a requirement that each program have a distinct name.176  As Professors 
Chip Lupu and Bob Tuttle point out, the settlement agreement establishes a distinction 
between the religious activities that the government can support and those that are 
“inherently religious activities” in “terms that are constitutionally accurate, 
unambiguous, and detailed.”177 
These cases, however, which address the direct use of these programs to promote 
religion, miss the larger issue of the promotion of cultural issues integrated with 
religious views at a time when the majority of American do not share them.  In 
surveys of the public attitude toward abstinence education, researchers repeatedly find 
                                                 
173 Id. Para. 62a.; see S. Shoshanna Ehrlich, From Age of Consent Laws to the “Silver Ring Thing”:  The 
Regulation of Adolescent Sexuality,  16 Health Matrix 151, 179-80 (2006). 
174 http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?id=3918 
175   Settlement Agreement, Sec. 2b., available at  
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/cases 
/SRT-HHS-ACLU_Settlement%202-24-06.pdf 
176 Id. 
177 Ira C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Update, 3/7/2006, available at 
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=44. 
 42
broad support for comprehensive information.  The level of support, however, varies, 
depending on the participants’ frequency of attendance at a religious institution; and 
evangelicals have a different approach than non-evangelicals. 178  In a survey of 1000 
people in late 2005, among people who attend religious services more frequently than 
once per week, 31.3% opposed abstinence only education, while among those who 
never attend religious services, 57% opposed abstinence only.179 
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Scalia accused Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, 
which struck down Texas’s same-sex sodomy statutes, as having “taken sides in the 
culture war.”180  Abstinence only education does so to a much greater degree.  
Comprehensive sex educations program provide information about and support for 
abstinence; abstinence only programs do not provide similar information about 
contraception, abortion or non-reproductive sexuality.  If the programs were effective in 
the religiously and culturally neutral objectives of delaying the beginning of sexuality, 
slowing the spread of STD’s, and preventing unwanted pregnancies, the efforts would be 
applauded on both sides of the cultural divide.  In the face of convincing evidence that 
they are both ineffective and counter-productive, they become little more than a vehicle 
for the partisan promotion of religiously identified, cultural views.181   
V. Toward Consensus?   Yes and No 
The law can diffuse or inflame the cultural conflicts described in this paper.  
Abstinence only education itself is a very public endorsement of one side of the cultural 
                                                 
178  NPR, Kaiser, etc., Sex Education in America (2004), available at  
http://www.npr.org/programs/morning/features/2004/jan/kaiserpoll/publicfinal.pdf; Amy Bleakley, et al., 
Public Opinion on Sex Education in US Schools, 160 Arch Pediatric Adolesc. Med. 1151 (2006).   
179 Bleakley, supra note __, at 1154-55. 
180 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
181 McGrath, supra note___. 
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divide.  In contrast, judicial decisions that distinguish between promotion of sectarian 
views and more secular forms of abstinence shift the discussion to more specialized and 
less intrinsically divisive issues.  The very decision to advocate public funding for 
religious groups to promote religiously identified views was a calculated political 
decision;182 the question then becomes how the judiciary and the public respond. 
 The law has several distinct means for responding to these different approaches to 
teen sexuality.  First, rather than one side trying to convert the other to the “right” view, it 
might be appropriate to examine any potential points of convergence,183 and then, as 
suggested by the cultural cognition literature, to develop programs for building dialogue.  
After all, attitudes toward sexuality are on a continuum.  At one extreme are those who 
would permit casual sexual activity between anyone who consents.184  At the other end 
are those who believe that sex should be limited to reproductive purposes within 
marriage, they would disapprove of sodomy and contraception even within marriage.185  
In the center is a large group that believes non-marital births are a greater problem than 
non-marital sex, and that use of contraception, not the negative example of the births, is 
the most important factor in decreasing their incidence.186  Notwithstanding the potential 
for consensus, activists do, however, divide into dichotomous groups, and group loyalty 
                                                 
182 For a comprehensive discussion of the politics, see Julie Jones, MONEY, SEX, AND THE RELIGIOUS 
RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF FEDERALLY FUNDED ABSTINENCE ONLY-
UNTIL-MARRIAGE SEXUALITY EDUCATION, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 1075 (2002).  
183  See Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1559, 
1608-12 (1991)(how pro-choice and anti-choice advocates can work together). 
184 Luker emphasizes, however, that even sexual liberals overwhelming prefer sex within marriage; it is the 
enforcement of such preferences that gives them greater pause.  Supra at  . 
185 For a history of the laws against non-reproductive sex within marriage, see Lawrence .v Texas, supra, 
539 U.S. at 572.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), after all, involved a law prohibiting 
distribution of contraception to married as well as unmarried couples. 
186 See, e.g., Heather Boonstra, Trends and Lessons Learned, the Guttmacher Report on Public Policy, Vol. 
1, Issue 5 (Feb. 2002), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/05/1/gr050107.html (concluding that the 
decline in teen pregnancies during the nineties was far more due to increased contraceptive use by sexually 
experienced teens than due to the increase in abstinence, which also contributed to the decline). 
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may be more important than the merits of an individual issue in determining political 
behavior such as voting.187   Accordingly, the potential for discourse within communities, 
where appeals to reason are not confounded by appeals to loyal, may offer greater 
potential for compromise, than discourse between communities.188  
 Some religious leaders, for example, have recognized the importance of using the 
language of faith to support the need for comprehensive sex education, so appealing to 
rhetoric that might satisfy both sides by promoting discourse within each position – for 
example, comprehensive sex education advocated by faith communities.  The Religious 
Institute on Sexual Morality, Justice, and Healing, which is an interfaith organization 
devoted to issues of advocating for sexual health and related issues in “faith 
communities,”189 issued an “Open Letter to Religious Leaders on Adolescent 
Sexuality.”190  The Letter uses faith-based language, such as recognizing that “sexuality 
is a divinely bestowed blessing,” and empirical evidence on teen pregnancy and sexually 
transmitted diseases to argue that faith communities must acknowledge that adolescents 
may belong to sexual minorities, may be abstinent, and may have been involved in sexual 
                                                 
187 See discussion of increased partisan identification and political divisions over values issues at notes  
supra. 
188 At one time, the legal profession would have constituted a distinct community with specialized language 
and professional identity and loyalty that transcended religious or partisan identification.  With 5-4 votes on 
contentious issues reflecting partisan identification, and fractured plurality opinions that provide little 
guidance to the lower courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has largely lost such an identification.  For a 
discussion of what makes the role of the courts political, compare Peter Gabel, What It Really Means To 
Say "Law Is Politics": Political History And Legal Argument In Bush V. Gore, 67 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1141 
(2002) with Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1721 (2001).  See also Red Families, supra (arguing that court has withdrawn from culturally divisive 
issues over abortion by excessive deference to state legislatures). 
189 http://www.religiousinstitute.org/about.html 
190 http://www.religiousinstitute.org/AdolSex_OpenLetter.pdf.  “The Open Letter to Religious Leaders on 
Adolescent Sexuality was developed at a colloquium of theologians sponsored by the Religious Institute on 
Sexual Morality, Justice, and Healing. The participants at the colloquium included theologians and 
ordained clergy from a diverse range of religious perspectives, including Jewish, Baptist, Brethren, 
Episcopal, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, United Church of Christ and Unitarian Universalist.” 
http://www.religiousinstitute.org/news.html 
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relationships, and that society must promote comprehensive sexuality education.191  This 
approach, using language that appeals to both sides, seems appropriate.  Ensuring that 
leaders within the different communities persuasively advocate, however, seems 
somewhat more difficult to ensure.       
 In addition to examining places of “overlapping consensus” 192 between the two 
different systems, a second approach draws on the federalist nature of family law, and 
then suggests one of two possibilities:  either states could continue to experiment with 
different approaches before imposing a national standard that would privilege one side, or 
the federal government could, in an attempt to prevent further divergence, simply impose 
a national norm. We explore these issues more comprehensively in a companion 
article.193  In the context of abstinence education, however, suffice it to say that the 
current status of federal law shows the danger of a national law that reflects only one side 
of the controversy and that rejects empirical evidence on the most appropriate policies.194   
Indeed, with a Democratically controlled House of Representatives, the continuation of 
Title V funding became highly questionable in mid-2007, and key members of Congress 
indicated their support for comprehensive sex education programs that included 
abstinence as well as other forms of education.195   
                                                 
191 Id. 
192 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 147 (1993); June Carbone, Autonomy to Choose what Constitutes 
a Family:  Oxymoron or Basic Right 19 (2006), avail. at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=935418#PaperDownload.   
193 See Cahn and Carbone, Red Families, supra note __. 
194 Id.  We argue in Red Families that partisan division over abortion has produced a change in the judicial 
role in parental involvement cases from judicial balancing of the substantive issues at stake in the seventies 
(Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)).to conflicting opinions that provide little guidance by the end of the 
eighties (see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. at 417 (1990)) to wholesale deference to state legislatures 
today. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006). 
195 Kevin Freking, Funding for Abstinence Likely to Drop, Wash. Post, May 16, 2007. 
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 Moreover, we are concerned that compromise dilutes the underlying messages 
concerning teen sexuality.  Conservatives and religious organizations are unwilling to 
recognize the value of other forms of sex education, while liberals, who share comparable 
goals of responsible sexuality, are more pragmatic and tolerant.   Compromise, which 
might involve teaching sex education, but only the abstinence education component, is, in 
this formulation, concession.  As one editorial bluntly explained, “The lavish spending 
[on abstinence education] reflects the Bush administration's blind faith in abstinence only 
and its insistence that the sole message kids receive is that premarital sex is wrong.  In 
such programs, even whispering the word "contraceptive" dilutes the "no sex" mantra.”196  
Given that more information and program evaluation are virtually irrelevant in changing 
positions, that compromise can mean foregoing fundamental values, then the political 
process becomes the most promising avenue for change.   And the means for doing that 
involve learning from both Lakoff and the Cultural Cognition Project: reframe the issues 
by using the language of the other side.197  Indeed, when the leading Democratic 
contenders in the 2008 Presidential campaign spoke movingly at a forum on faith about 
the significance of religion to their lives, prompting a charge that the Democrats sounded 
like “evangelicals,” compared to the Republicans, who sounded like “secularists.”198 
 Finally, political scientists and lawyers have each been involved in a longstanding 
debate:  does change come from imposing the law or from grass-roots pressure?  The 
recent history of Supreme Court family law cases, from Loving199 to Roe200 to Roper201 
                                                 
196 Editorial, ‘Just say No’ The Wrong Way to Go, Atlanta-Journal Constitution, May 27, 2007, p. 6B. 
197  See supra nn. 41-47.   
198   Ruth Marcus, The Democrats’ Leap of Faith, Wash. Post, June 6, 2007, at A23. 
199 388 U.S. 1 (1967)(declaring anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional). 
200 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)(finding anti-abortion provisions conflicted with women’s 
reproductive rights). 
201 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005)(declaring juvenile death penalty unconstitutional). 
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to Gonzales v. Carhart,202 shows both; individual states changed their laws, responding to 
changing moral and popular sentiment, and ultimately prompted the Supreme Court to 
revise national standards.       
Conclusion  
 Religion, as the evolutionary biologists and election observers both observe, is a 
critical factor in developing moral values. When religion overlaps with partisan identity, 
and when politicians deliberately frame partisan issues in terms of cultural divisions, 
dichotomous (or at least seemingly dichotomous) positions dominate debate.203  As the 
approaches threaten to diverge even more, as those who attend religious services at least 
once a week and those who rarely attend – if ever – reach opposite conclusions on 
fundamental issues, finding common themes becomes increasingly important.  Ironically, 
perhaps, these calls for compromise typically come from only one side, providing some 
grounds for pessimism.  In the short term, using the consensus positions developed by 
some within the faith-based community as a means for  talking to both sides may provide 
a way forward.    
 Ultimately, however, on issues of family values, the more direct introduction of 
religion into public life runs the risk of further polarizing discourse, and hardening 
opposing positions in ways that short-circuit the evolution of the underlying normative 
values.  While profound disagreement would exist in any event, religion may exacerbate 
those differences by linking policy positions to issues of identity, and doing so in a way 
that hampers effective discourse or compromise.  Religion complicates these difficulties 
in the following ways: 
                                                 
202 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)(upholding ban on partial birth abortions). 
203 For an account of the deliberate manipulation of such strategies to advance extreme views, see Hacker, 
supra, at 1-11. 
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1. The form of argument:  Many communities of faith accept more authoritarian styles 
of argument likely to be rejected by secular communities.  It is commonplace, for 
example, to find comments like the following on the Web: “The Bible clearly and 
consistently tells us that homosexual activity is a sin.204 God does not create a person 
with homosexual desires. A person becomes a homosexual because of sin,205 and 
ultimately because of his or her own choice.”206  These comments state a conclusion in 
terms of an appeal to authority that brooks no discussion or dissent.   When they are 
advanced as a basis for public policy outcomes, they also alienate those who do not share 
the same perspective. 
2. The role of religion in creating identity:  Citizenship in a democracy is mediated by 
overlapping membership in various groups, each of which contributes partially to the 
individual’s construction of self.  When one form of identity becomes comprehensive to 
the exclusion of others, it can build in isolation and extremism.  Consider Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali’s description of the role of the veil within Muslin communities in Europe:  
 The veil is an expression of the moral philosophy they [veil wearing Islamic 
women] hold and wish to impose upon others. They seek to provoke, to intimidate. 
In many European cities it is increasingly common to see girls, sometimes as young 
as 5, with headscarves tied tightly around their necks, or even little veils. They are 
taught to keep away from boys, from unbelievers and from Muslims who are weak in 
the faith--in other words, other unveiled Muslim little girls. That is precisely the 
purpose of the veil.207 
 
The Catholic Church’s suggestion that pastors should deny communion to those who 
                                                 
204 Genesis 19:1-13; Leviticus 18:22; Romans 1:26-27; 1 Corinthians 6:9. 
205 Romans 1:24-27. 
206 GotQuestions.org, “What Does the Bible say about Gay Marriage/Same Sex Marriage?” 
http://www.gotquestions.org/gay-marriage.html.  See also The Kingdom Foundation, 
“HOMOSEXUALITY is a forgivable SIN,” 
http://www.kingdomfoundation.org/livingnow/godswordhomosexuality.html (God addresses and condemns 
homosexuality in His holy scripture.  The Bible is very clear as is the Torah.  Homosexuality is a sin that is 
condemned by God.”) 
207Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Setting Themselves Apart,  American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Nov. 22, 2006, avail. at http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25183/pub_detail.asp. 
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support abortion rights, while less premised on physical separation, also serves to draw 
an impermeable line between observant Catholics and others.208  In contrast, the principle 
of tolerance may require separation of appropriate behavior and arguments within public 
society from the form and content of beliefs that may be privately held. 
3. Religious beliefs often encourage behavior that reinforces identification with the 
faith.  Fundamentalist religions, for example, often encourage early marriage and large 
families.  These large families are then welcomed into communities of faith that provide 
support for childrearing.  Given the dependence that children produce, managing outside 
of the marriage or the faith-based community becomes that much more difficult.  Darren 
Sherkat writes that: 
Studies consistently show that among sectarian Protestant fertility is higher, and ages 
of marriage are lower  The burden of early marriage and fertility are also likely 
factors in low rates of educational attainment for conservative Christian men, since 
having a family often requires forsaking future rewards which could accrue from 
educational attainment for the immediate benefits of employment. Large family size, 
coupled with limited wealth, will also hinder sectarian Christian parents’ ability to 
help finance the educational pursuits of their children. This may help explain lower 
rates of college attendance and completion among conservative Christians.209  
 
Such results produce reinforcing cycles as the habits of mind of the more educated and 
less educated may be reinforced by different experiences and values.   
 4.  To the extent that religious membership then correlates more strongly with 
family form and political party identification,210 a single more ideological, more partisan 
or more sectarian identity can work to undermine the partial roles that have historically 
                                                 
208 See, e.g., JimmyAkin.org, quoting the synod of bishops, objecting that "Some receive communion while 
denying the teachings of the Church or publicly supporting immoral choices in life, such as abortion, 
without thinking that they are committing an act of grave personal dishonesty and causing scandal . . . "  
July 8, 2005, http://jimmyakin.typepad.com/defensor_fidei/2005/07/new_doc_on_abor.html. 
209 The Religious Engagments of American Undergraduates, Darren E. Sherkat, Religion and Higher 
Education: the Good, the Bad and the Ugly, Feb 06, 2007, 
http://religion.ssrc.org/reforum/Sherkat/index1.html. 
210 See data presented earlier on the differences in church attendance by Democrats and Republicans. 
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allowed democratic institutions to bridge differences.  Members of Congress, for 
example, once viewed their loyalty to Congress as an institution as separate from their 
roles as Democrats or Republicans.  If the well-being of the nation, however, is identified 
with the inflexible content of certain beliefs, then the institutions themselves can be 
sacrified to advance the right causes.   
 Greater partisanship can also be self-reinforcing.   A liberal columnist in the Los 
Angeles Times observed, for example, “Your average conservative may not know 
anything about climate science, but conservatives do know they hate Al Gore. So, hold 
up Gore as a hate figure and conservatives will let that dictate their thinking on the 
issue.”  The net result is that as the evidence of global warming has increased, the 
percentage of Republicans who respond to public opinion polls by saying that the case 
has been made has decreased.211  
 5. Neutralizing the role of the courts: Federal political appointments have clearly 
become politicized and in many states the public elects judges or votes to continue them 
in office.212  To the extent that the courts lack independence, and to the extent that 
cautious, legally grounded decision become defined in partisan terms, the court lose their 
ability to provide effective leadership.  At that point, legislative judgments become 
paramount.213  
 Polarization not only increases conflict over issues such as the control of 
adolescent sexuality, but it also slows the evolution of new norms within and across 
                                                 
211l Jonathan Chait, Why the right goes nuclear over global warming:  Most of the heat is generated by a 
small number of hard-core ideologues. 
March 25, 2007,  http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-op-
chait25mar25,0,3748551.column?coll=la-news-comment-opinions 
 
212 Hacker, supra, at 105-06.  See also American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the United States, 
http://www.ajs.org/js/materials.htm. 
213 For a more in depth development of this argument, see Red Families, supra. 
 51
communities.  The adoption of same-sex marriage in Canada, for example, has spurred a 
debate with gay and lesbian communities about the meaning of marriage, and the sight of 
same-sex couples affirming their unions has helped to remake the image of marriage as 
less patriarchal and more egalitarian.214  In similar fashion, the ineffectiveness of 
abstinence only policies should spark debate about the consequences of unplanned 
pregnancies and the need for contraception.  If the positions on these issues, however, 
become matters of loyalty, then the more moderate compromises that might allow 
institutions to grow and change, and that might provide children with enough information 
so that they can make their own choices, become impossible.  Compromising on 
language – using the language of faith – to advocate the same policies may provide 
leverage where trumpeting the results of new studies will not.  Compromising on the law 
– allowing abstinence only education because it is at least a form of sex education – 
serves no one.  Highly publicized and contentious battles over adolescent sex education 
in legislatures and courts involving constitutional issues of free exercise provide an 
example of how religious rhetoric trumps legal standards.  As the country develops red 
and blue family models, religion is a significant factor in creating and maintaining those 
models through its efforts to control teen sexuality to foster particular family forms. 
Religion reinforces conflicting approaches to fundamental cultural values, affecting the 
laws surrounding the family lives of Americans.   
.    
                                                 
214 See, e.g., Nicholas Bala, The Debates About Same-Sex Marriage in Canada and the United States: 
Controversy Over the Evolution of a Fundamental Social Institution, 20 BYU J. Pub. L. 195 (2006); Law 
Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality 30 (2002) (recommending a fundamental rethinking of the 
legal regulation of adult personal relationships). 
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Required Parental 
Involvement in Minors’ 
Abortions216 
State215 
 
Consent Notification None 
Teen 
Pregnancy 
Rate 
Rank217 
Teen 
Abortion 
Rate 
Rank218 
Church  
Attendance 
24-58% 219  
 
  Alabama r X   15 30 58%  
Alaska r ▼   30 35 N/A  
Arizona r X   2 19 35%  
Arkansas r X   10 41 55%  
California ▼   7 5 32%  
Colorado r  X  22 21 35%  
Connecticut   X 33 9 37%  
Delaware  X*220  11 8 43%  
DC   X na na 33%  
Florida r  X  6 7 N/A  
Georgia r  X  8 22 52%  
Hawaii   X 12 6 N/A  
Idaho r §   37 45 43%  
Illinois  ▼  20 10 42%  
Indiana r  X   31 38 46%  
Iowa  X  43 42 46%  
Kansas r  X  34 39 47%  
Kentucky r X   25 47 48%  
Louisiana r X   19 44 58%  
Maine   X 46 31 31%  
Maryland  X*  13 3 41%  
Massachusetts X   40 11 31%  
Michigan X   27 15 N/A  
Minnesota  Both 
parents 
 47 36 44%  
Mississippi r Both 
parents 
  3 28 57%  
Missouri r X   29 34 46%  
Montana r  ▼  38 32 34%  
Nebraska r  X  41 40 53%  
                                                 
215 Red indicates that George W. Bush won the state in the 2004 presidential election; Blue indicates that 
John Kerry won the state in the 2004 presidential election. 
216 Except where indicated, parental involvement laws in minors’ abortions require the involvement of one 
parent and apply to minors under 18. 
217 Ranking by rates of pregnancy per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of residence, 2000. 
218 Ranking by rates of abortion per 1,000 women aged 15-19 according to state of residence, 2000. 
219   Church or Synagogue Attendance by State, San Diego Union-Tribune, May 2, 2006.  The national 
average is 42% or people who say they attend a church or synagogue either once a week or almost once per 
week.  There are no blue states in the top 15, and only one red state in the bottom 15. 
220 Law applies to women under 16 
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Nevada r  ▼  1 4 27% 
New 
Hampshire 
 ▼  48 25 24% 
New Jersey  ▼  16 1 34% 
New Mexico r ▼   4 18 41% 
New York   X 14 2 33% 
North 
Carolina r 
X   9 17 53% 
North Dakota 
r 
Both 
parents 
  50 48 43% 
Ohio r X   28 27 43% 
Oklahoma r  X  21 37 50% 
Oregon   X 23 13 32% 
Pennsylvania X   39 23 43% 
Rhode Island X   36 16 N/A 
South 
Carolina r 
X221   17 24 58% 
South Dakota 
r 
 X  44 49 45% 
Tennessee r X   18 29 52% 
Texas r X   5 26 49% 
Utah r  X  45 50 55% 
Vermont   X 49 33 24% 
Virginia r X   32 20 44% 
Washington   X 26 12 32% 
West Virginia 
r 
 X*  35 46 46% 
Wisconsin X*   42 43 43% 
Wyoming r X   24 14 36% 
Total 25 18 7 + 
DC 
  
 
▼ Enforcement permanently enjoined by court order; policy not in effect. 
§ Temporarily blocked by court order; policy not in effect. 
* Allows specified health professionals to waive parental involvement if judge is 
unavailable. 
˜ Physicians may, but is not required to, inform the minor’s parent 
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